

The Meaning of “Taiwanese”: Conceptualizing the Components of Taiwanese National Identity*

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Abstract

One of the problems with empirical studies of Taiwanese/Chinese identity in Taiwan is the use of over-simplified measurements based on responses to a question involving three choices: is your nationality Taiwanese, Chinese, or both? This study attempts to produce a new model with a more fine-grained conceptualization of national identity in Taiwan. The model is derived from Rawi Abdelal et al.’s idea of social identity, and applies Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM) to survey data, to develop a social psychological framework using three independent latent variables: “national norms,” “national closeness,” and “national purposes,” and a single dependent latent variable: “state identity.” The results of this re-analysis show all three of the independent variables have significant positive correlations with the dependent variable “state identity.” Of the independent variables, national norms has the highest total effect.

For respondents self-identifying as Taiwanese (T respondents) and respondents self-identifying as Chinese (C respondents), there were significant differences in two dimensions: national purposes and national norms. The strength of T respondents’ national purposes is higher than C

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respondents while the strength of C respondents' national norms is higher than T respondents. In addition, a comparison of total effect value and outer weight found that T respondents and respondents self-identifying as both Taiwanese and Chinese (B respondents) also differed. Both T and B respondents stress on "state-building," a component of the latent variable national purposes. For the dependent variable state identity, however, B and T respondents differ. T respondents take a pro-Taiwan and anti-unification stance. B respondents, however, take a pro-"Republic of China" and pro-democratic unification stance. Variables such as age, education, and social contacts all have moderating effects for both T and B respondents but not great enough to change the path direction.

Keywords: social identity, Taiwanese/Chinese identity, conceptualization,
Primer on Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling

The question of Taiwanese/Chinese identity has been a central issue in Taiwan politics,¹ political science, and journalism. Taiwan serves as a unique case for studying national identity because, on the one hand, it is different from multi-national countries such as Russia, the former Yugoslavia, and Britain, which have self-identified ethnic groups and officially list nationalities on passports (Brady and Kaplan 2009; Levy 2008; 2014). On the other hand, it is also different from the case of Spanish people who see themselves as both Catalan and Spanish in association with regional identities. The Taiwanese/Chinese identity issue is complicated because this concept is used widely and interchangeably with country/state identity and party identity (Liu 2012a).²

Studies of this subject are grounded in the theoretical paradigm of nationalism in that Taiwan is involved in the normative controversy of Independence/Unification (Dittmer 2004; Lynch 2004; Rigger 1999; Schubert 2004; Wang and Liu 2004). Researchers often see nationalism as a mutual exclusive struggle between Chinese nationalism and Taiwanese nationalism (e.g. Rigger 1999, 539).

However, as frequently happens, conceptual problems can be obstacles to theoretical progress in political science (Johnson 2003). The normative controversy taints studies using a single, oppositional categorical measurement of Taiwanese and/or Chinese identity (Levy

¹ There are several names of Taiwanese/Chinese identity. Sometimes call “ethnic identity,” “national identity,” “self-identification,” “self-recognition,” “ethnic awareness,” and “national-ethnic identity” (Liu and Ho 1999, 5-6). To avoid confusion, this study follows Liu and Ho and uses Taiwanese/Chinese identity but orients it as a national identity level for two reasons: (1) according to nationalism theory a nation corresponds to a state And (2) inter-ethnic conflict has been transformed into the inter-national conflict (Huang 2007, 454; Wu 2002).

² I discern Taiwanese/Chinese identity at the national level from an ethnic or sub-ethnic identity and state identity. Ethnic and national identities are similar in that they both have racial, cultural, religious, or linguistic characteristics and political content when it comes to the concept of sovereign state building (Anderson 1991; Schermerhorn 1974; Smith 1991). When it comes to analysis, however, it is agreed that the nation often refers to a larger scale than does the ethnic (Ger 1991; Shi 2000). Hobsbawm (1992, 8) notes that “any sufficiently large body of people whose members regard themselves as members of a ‘nation’ will be treated as such.” Hence, Taiwanese is a nation analytically and groups such as Minnan and Hakka represent ethnic groups. Scholars also warn that national identity differs from state identity (Jiang 1998; 2006; Shi 2004). A nation stresses shared culture, values, folkways, religion, and/or languages, whereas a state is an institutional apparatus that exerts sovereignty and regulates public affairs (Hay, Lister, and Marsh 2006, 7-10). In this way, the identity target and implication of nation and state are different.

2008; 2014; Rigger 1999, 538), to test the nation-state assumptions (i.e. national identity-> state identity). This dichotomy is reflected in common survey questions, such as “In Taiwan, some people think they are Taiwanese. There are also some people who think that they are Chinese. Do you consider yourself to be Taiwanese, Chinese, or both?” Respondents who self-identify with “Taiwanese” are assumed to favor Taiwan independence, while those who identify as “Chinese” are assumed to favor unification with mainland China (Chen, Chen, and Wang 2012; Chen, Keng, Cheng, and Yu 2009; Chen, Keng, Tu, and Huang 2009; Cheng 2012; Hsiao and Yu 2012; Huang 2007; 2009; 2010; Keng, Liu, and Chen 2009; Shyu 2004; Sun and Wong 2005; Wong and Sun 1998).

Studies grounded in such nationalistic assumptions have flaws. The problematic definition of nation-state by Anthony Smith (1991) confuses issues of nation and state, such as legal rights and so forth (Guibernau 2004). Such confusion sidetracks researchers who seek to predict the opinion trend of Independence/Unification, not Taiwanese/Chinese identity in depth.

Studies based on a single indicator of national identity provide a limited picture as well. National identity is a form of social identity with many facets (Abdelal et al. 2006; 2009; Brewer 2001). Nationalism is merely one component of national identity. Yet political identities are commonly measured with a single question, whereas in social psychology, identity is determined based on multiple-item subscales including the subjective importance of an identity, a subjective sense of belonging, feeling one’s status is interdependent with that of other group members, and positive feelings for members of the in-group, in order to measure ethnic and national identity and show internal reliability (Huddy 2013).

Since the oppositional, categorical measurement views group identity as “an all-or-nothing phenomenon” (Huddy 2001, 145), it is difficult to capture the salience of a particular national group to such component even though such dichotomous or trichotomous measures are useful for gauging self-categorization. However, they are only appropriate where individuals perceive the identities that are not congruent or when identity is highly salient (Levy 2008; 2014).

Second, conceptually, such trichotomous measurements mainly reflect the normative debate on the legitimacy of the Republic of China versus a new state. They do not focus on understanding what a Taiwanese, Chinese, and “both” identity means to the residents of Taiwan. For example, the response “both” (i.e. I am both Taiwanese and Chinese) sheds very little light on the subjective meaning of this answer to respondents (Tung 2013, 130). In fact, respondents’ self-placement on the spectrum of identity position, from Taiwanese, to both, to Chinese, is

an oversimplified and measurement of a complex question such as national identity has many suppositions built into it.

Researchers have recognized the importance of a national identity with multiple dimensions in Taiwan (Chen 2012; Chen, Keng, Cheng, and Yu 2009; Cheng 2012; Chuang 2003; Huang 2007; 2009; 2010; Li 2003; Tung 2013). Yet, even studies that recognize the utility of this approach seldom attempt to establish differences between respondents identifying as “Taiwanese,” “Chinese” or “both.” This lack of dimensionality in studies of national identity in Taiwan has left a gap in the research record on how people in Taiwan self-identify and how to analyze such group differentiation.

Several studies have recently argued that the idea of social identity introduced in Abdelal et al. (2006; 2009) could be helpful in exploring the meaning of social identity (Cheng 2012; Seawright 2011). The advantage of the Social Identity framework is that it provides concepts and definitions that help to specify and gather items for the questionnaire design in two specific dimensions: content, and contestation. Content includes “constitutive norms,” “social purpose,” “relational comparison,” and “cognitive models,” which includes seven features, while contestation represents the degree of agreement between an in-group and an out-group.

Second, national identity, similar to social identity, also embraces such content, which cause its membership to identify with it collectively. Second, Social Identity theory argues that based on different factors, processes of self-categorizations and then generates social identities to define inter-group relationships (such as Taiwanese and Chinese groups). They then take advantage of identity management strategies and social comparison to maintain both positive in-group identity and negative out-group identity, as a determinant of their social perceptions and social behaviors (Ellemers and Haslam 2012; McDermott 2009). This view imbues the framework with theoretical implications (e.g. social cognition) and fosters the problem of conceptual conflation.

To show how social identity can shed new light on major issues in the literature, this paper begins with a review of studies using the conventional measurement of national identity, which focuses heavily on nationalism and postulates a strong correlation between national identity and unification–independence preferences. In the second part, I propose a conceptualization of Taiwanese/Chinese identity using a model built on Abdelal et al.’s idea, using multiple variables to measure Taiwanese/Chinese identity. The third part presents the validity test results of the model using Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM) and contrasts the different results of Multi-group analysis (PLS-MGA) for respondents self-identifying as

“Taiwanese,” “Chinese,” and “both.” The last section concludes the paper and discusses the implications of this alternative set of constructs and the inspiration from social psychological regarding the study of Taiwanese/Chinese identity.

I. Reflection on National Identity Measurement in the Taiwan Context

Anthony Smith’s *National Identity* (Smith 1991) has had a strong influence on nationalism studies (Cheng 2012; Jiang 1998; 2006; Wang and Liu 2004),³ particularly in Taiwan, where it has inspired scholars to take a normative, strongly theoretical approach to Taiwanese/Chinese identity. Taiwanese/Chinese identity is thus reduced to a simple predictor of state identity (independence/unification choice).

Smith defines national identity as “a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members” (Smith 1991, 14). He then defines nationalism as “an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity for a population which some of its members deem to constitute an actual or potential nation” (Smith 2010, 9). Nationalism is regarded as a doctrine of culture, a symbolic language and consciousness used to create a cultural nation (Smith 2010, 99). Arguably, nationalism is a motivational state of national identity to purposely reach political end state through action (Dunning 2015) and such components including language, culture, and consciousness.

Most scholars in Taiwan have adopted this essentialist approach to modelling nationalism and focus on prediction of individual unification-independence preferences (Wang 1993; Wong and Sun 1998). Some studies expand the focus to two dimensions: an ethnic dimension (e.g. ethnic identity, ethnic differences, ethnic pride, and shared fate) and a political dimension (e.g. future national status, self-determination, national survival, and shared experiences) (Chen 2012; Cheng 2012; Chu 2004; Liu 2012a; Shyu 2004). Other studies attempt to evaluate the effect of “ethnicity” and “rationality” on the choice of Independence/Unification (Chen, Keng, Cheng, and

³ Another mainstream is the constructivist approach from Benedict Anderson’s *Imagined Communities* (Dawley 2009; Lynch 2004; Shaw 2002). Anderson views the nation as an “imagined political community,” stresses its invention and creation and refuses any primordialism (Anderson 1983, 6). He argues that an exclusive expression of a group’s national desire for excretion of political autonomy of a community in a limited national boundary (Anderson 1991; Stiles 2002, 257).

Yu 2009; Chen, Keng, Tu, and Huang 2009; Hsiao and Yu 2012; Wang and Liu 2004; Wu 1993; 2002; 2005; Wu 2004).

Measurement of nationalism in such studies is thus based on two types of survey items. The first is “Are you Taiwanese, Chinese, or both?” This survey item looks simple, convenient, and straightforward and has been widely used in Taiwan studies. The second type of item is a direct question asking the respondent’s unification-independence preference. The assumption is clearly that a resident of Taiwan who self-identifies as “Taiwanese” will favor Taiwan’s independence, while a person who self-identifies as “Chinese” will favor unification with China.

Both of these survey items have limitations which come from the assumptions they incorporate from Smith's work. As Guibernau (2004) argues, Smith fails to clearly differentiate the concepts of nations and states, since he attributes features of the state, such as legal rights and duties, to the nation. Smith (2010) removes “mass,” “common economy,” “common rights and duties” from his original 1991 definition. A result of this confusion is the relation between Taiwanese/Chinese identity and Independence/Unification: most studies test the nationalistic assumption and fail to explore a multi-component Taiwanese/Chinese identity. As Wang and Liu (2004) argue, the independence/unification measurement is problematic because it confuses respondents’ views on policy with their underlying attitudes toward a political community. Thus, studies that emphasize the first type of survey item may link it not to national identity but to other concepts, such as state/country identity (Independence/Unification), cultural/civil identity, or self-identity. Studies that use the second measurement risk a jump in logic by not examining the core meaning of national identity.

Studies using a one dimensional measurement of Taiwanese/Chinese identity plus unification-independence preference are common and can be traced to Wu (1993). Wu created a nationalism model with affective and pragmatic factors such as “China’s threat” and “economic benefits.”⁴ It assumes that those who prefer independence and oppose unification have a Taiwanese (nationalist) identity, those who favor unification but not independence have a Chinese (nationalist) identity, and those who express support for “both” are regarded as not

⁴ The wording of the questions is as follows: 1. “Some people say, ‘If Taiwan could maintain peaceful relations with the Chinese communists after declaring independence, then Taiwan should become independent and establish a new country.’ Do you support this way of thinking?” 2. “Some people say, ‘If Taiwan and Mainland are comparable in their economic, social and political conditions, then the two sides should be unified.’ Do you support this way of thinking” (as originally translated into English in Rigger 1999, 542).

(yet) having a national identity. The advantage of Wu's approach, as social identity theorists such as Huddy (2002) and Oakes (2002) have noted, is that it considers pragmatic factors to probe respondent's true preferences that may convert the respondents' selection of and independence/unification under uncertain conditions (Dittmer 2004; Lacy and Niou 2004). Wu's conclusion was that Taiwan residents would tend to favor Taiwan independence and oppose unification, based on such pragmatic reasons. Since then, studies on independence/unification have consistently used this type of survey item with pragmatic cues (Chu 2004; Lacy and Niou 2004; Marsh 2002; Wu 2004). Nevertheless, as Jiang (1998) points out, Wu infers nationalism as a basis for independence/unification choices while overlooking the diverse meanings of nationalism.

Based on these limitations, recent studies have started to revisit the components, scale, and framework of Taiwanese/Chinese identity. New components introduced into analytic frameworks include cultural and political components. Cheng (2012), for example, argues that "Taiwan identity" can be divided into cultural identity and political identity. These two variables measured by two single-indicators constitute a 2x2 analytical framework and give four typologies: "cultural China; political China," "cultural China; political Taiwan," "cultural Taiwan; political China," "cultural Taiwan; political Taiwan."⁵ Cheng's survey results found that the majority in Taiwan is "cultural Taiwan; political Taiwan." While Cheng has extended the characteristics national identity, her framework still uses two "all-or-nothing" variables for each dimension.

Several studies apply psychological theories such as Sear's symbolic politics theory and introduce more variables (Chen, Chen, and Wang 2012; Chen, Keng, Cheng, and Yu 2009; Chen, Keng, Tu, and Huang 2009; Shyu 2004) to shed light on the interest/ideology-based factor. An example of this approach is Chen, Keng, Cheng, and Yu (2009), which adopts Smith's national identity and ethnic attitudes as described in Social Dominant Theory (SDT) in order to examine the social stimuli contributing to "Taiwan identity/Taiwan consciousness." Stimuli include the unpleasant past images, experiences, and memories of unfair treatment by the KMT government, that they suggest has influenced the relationship between Mainlanders (generally refer to

⁵ The wording of the questions is as follows, for cultural identity, "I always say 'Chinese culture,' do you think the 'Taiwan culture' is a part of 'Chinese culture' or both of them are totally different culture when you say 'Taiwanese culture'?" for political identity, "Someone say: 'Taiwan should be unified with China in the future which can improve the people livelihood, but someone also say that, Taiwan should on her own way that also maintain the people livelihood,' which statement do you agree with" (translated into English by Author).

emigrates from Mainland after 1949) and Islanders. Chen, Keng, Cheng, and Yu (2009) found that there are two sets of positive correlations. First, respondents with negative memories have higher “Taiwan identity.” Second, respondents have positive feelings or frequent interactions with Islanders; also have higher “Taiwan identity.”

Chen, Keng, Cheng, and Yu (2009) is notable for a new measure for “Taiwan identity,” which is correlated with Taiwanese/Chinese identity, and includes five dimensions: land (loving Taiwan), people (pride in being Taiwanese), culture (cultural sameness between Taiwan and China), language (speaking Taiwanese language) and regime (support indigenous regime) with a high statistically reliability as the origin of “Taiwan identity.”⁶ Using this revised scale in a consequent study, Chen, Keng, Tu, and Huang (2009), contend that “Taiwan consciousness” is motivated by perceptual factors (i.e. loving Taiwan, pride in being Taiwanese, support of an indigenous regime) and suggest that symbolic attitudes have a comparative effect on attitudes toward both Cross-Strait trade policy and “Taiwanese/Chinese” identity. The findings of these studies are consistent with Sear’s theory: individual “emotion” overrides “rationales” in policy position and Taiwanese/Chinese identity (Chen, Chen, and Wang 2012; Chen, Keng, Tu, and Huang 2009). Finally, Chen, Keng, Cheng, and Yu (2009) not only establish an *interdisciplinary* method to study “Taiwan identity,” but also recognize psychological “relational content” from life experiences as a crucial component of identity. This is an advance on earlier studies and I adopt the dimensions and indicators Chen, Keng, Cheng, and Yu (2009) proposes.⁷

However, it should also be noted that Sears’ theory conflicts with rationalist explanations for political behavior. Thus, he pays less attention to mediation effects. However, opinion often influences policy at the implementation level (such as Independence/Unification effects or trade agreements effects). Thus, opinion is sensitive to pragmatic considerations and often fluctuates.

⁶ The wording of the questions is as follows: 1. Is it necessary to stress the statement “we must love Taiwan, this land;” 2. Is it necessary to stress the statement “we must take pride in being Taiwanese;” 3. Do you agree that “Taiwan should develop a culture that is different from China;” 4. Do you agree that “people who love Taiwan should speak Taiwanese language;” 5. Do you agree that “lovers should support an indigenous regime.” Chen, Keng, Tu, and Huang (2009) reduce the indicators of cultural identity and language identity in the “Taiwan consciousness” measurement.

⁷ Shyu (2004) has useful referential value. It explores the content (i.e. ethnic pride, choice of state, choice of “independence/unification”) and factors (“Taiwan-China Concern”) of Taiwanese/Chinese identity and reminds us that collective cultural complexes can be measured at the individual level. Shyu addresses the “Taiwan/China Concern” at the individual level, which reflects a two-oppositional cultural cluster concept that is the “Taiwan-China Complex” at the collective level.

If the benefits of cross-strait policy are perceived as the same for everyone, pragmatic interests can overcome other factors in the views on Taiwanese/Chinese identity. An example of this is in Tung (2013) which illustrates how in a survey from the Taiwan Competitiveness Forum the percentage of the respondents self-identified as “Taiwanese, not Chinese” progressively decreased to 22.9% when given economic incentive cues. In addition, “Taiwan consciousness” can be categorized as a defensive reaction to “China consciousness” (Chen, Keng, Tu, and Huang 2009), yet as Hsu (2001) argues, creating a symbolic counter group requires a group identity to begin with. In other words, “national consciousness” is only a part of Taiwanese/Chinese identity. Thus, despite the improvements in the above-mentioned works, they continue to use the essentialist and either/or categorized measurement which nevertheless fails to robustly capture respondents’ political beliefs (Wang and Liu 2004, 574).

Other studies have challenged the role of nationalism, as defined by Smith, in identification processes. For example, Liu and Ho (1999) found that the percentage of Taiwan residents self-identifying as “Chinese” has decreased, while those self-identifying as “Taiwanese” had increased remarkably, and that this change occurred regardless of objective features such as ethnic background, age, educational level, and gender, or partisan politics. Instead, political symbols like “New Taiwanese” and “special state-to-state” assertion as well as nonpolitical exchanges across the Taiwan Strait may have motivated the dramatic identity shift. Tung (2013) contends that democracy is a priming factor of Taiwanese/Chinese identity.

Indeed, as Hsu and Fan (2001) observe, nationalism appears to be an outdated, static schema-led explanation of political formation. They instead adopt “prospective rationality” (a form of informational processing) derived from the rationalist tradition to construct a pragmatic model of “Taiwanese/Chinese Identity.” In this model, identity is a rational guide of individual political interest and orientation that comes from social learning to functionally deal with the situational uncertainty and the future. This result shows that both changing attitudes as one ages and external political changes can affect the formation of a new identity. This study returns the concept of social learning mechanism (i.e. cognitive ability) to the analysis, a marked advantage. However, the incentive of changing identity has not been sufficiently defined.

Second, Tung (2013) contends that categorized measurements are unable to show what the features of the “Both” identity are. He gives a survey from “the Taiwan Competitiveness Forum” as an example. The survey, conducted in February 2013, suggests that over half of the respondents self-identified as “Chinese” (61%, vs. self-identified “Taiwanese” 35%). In

addition to the result contradicting the conventional wisdom that the majority self-identify as “Taiwanese,” the survey presumed that all respondents were Taiwanese and downgraded the analytical unit from national to ethnic and/or regional level. Next, the questions began with leading phrases: “*Chinese nations share common ancestors, language, history and culture; do you think of yourself as a member of this Chinese culture?*” followed by the key question “*Do you think of yourself as Chinese?*” Third, consistent with Tung’s argument (Tung 2013), this survey mixed national identification with cultural identification, which can easily motivate respondents “explicit and implicit consciousness” and drive respondents to express their consent (Li 2003).

A few researchers noted the flaw of the categorized measurement. They focus instead on the subjective meaning and use graded latent variables to treat the abstract Taiwanese/Chinese identity. For example, Chen (2012) draws a two-dimensional framework of national identity from Anthony Smith’s (1991) nationalism theory but adopts the latent variable approach. Chen draws indicators from ready-made a questionnaire and divides them into primordial indicators (ethnic identity, ethnic differences, ethnic pride, and shared fate) and political indicators (future national status, self-determination, national survival, and shared experiences). This reduces measurement bias. Chen also introduces multiple indicators to measure different dimensional of identity. He found that the political component is increasingly important in Taiwan politics over time.

Huang (2007; 2010) first employs psychological scales termed “right-wing authoritarianism” (RWA, obedience to authority) and “social dominance theory” (SDT, support for the unequal relationship between dominant group and subordinate group) and then set up four latent variables, namely, RWA, SDT, “autonomy,” and “openness.” Huang’s results show that “only Taiwanese” (i.e. I am Taiwanese, not Chinese) identifiers have lower performance on the four latent variables than “Chinese first” (i.e. I am Chinese and Taiwanese). Using structural equation modeling, she also found that the RWA and SDT factors show a positive correlation with “Great China ideology” but exhibited a negative correlation with “loving Taiwan ideology” and “Taiwan independence ideology.” Conversely, “autonomy,” and “openness” display a positive correlation with “loving Taiwan ideology” and “Taiwan independence ideology” but exhibited a negative correlation with “Great China ideology.”⁸ These studies thus exhibit a

⁸ Huang (2010) adopted a focus-group method to establish five groups: 1. Chinese First: I am Chinese and Taiwanese; 2. Taiwanese First: I am Taiwanese and Chinese; 3. Taiwanese Only: I am Taiwanese, not Chinese; 4. Chinese Only, I am Chinese, not Taiwanese; and 5. Neither, I am neither Taiwanese

different mental structure for each group's identifiers.

Chuang's study (Chuang 2003) focuses on the causal relations between Taiwanese/Chinese identity (ethnic identity), stereotype, Independence/Unification, and attitude on Cross-Strait exchange using Social Identity Theory. This theory posits that once someone self-categorizes as a specific group (e.g. Taiwanese identifiers) then prejudice toward out-groups (e.g. Chinese) would occur, in order to maintain a positive "we group" social position. Chuang offers two valuable findings. First, the results show that Taiwanese/Chinese identity has a moderate effect on prejudice, which indirectly shapes attitudes toward independence/unification and Cross-Strait exchange. Second, respondents with negative attitudes toward Chinese have lower willingness conducting economic or cultural exchanges with China. Indeed, this is a rare theoretically inspired study about Taiwanese/Chinese identity. However, the validity of the structure model is weak in that generally the categorical variable (i.e. Taiwanese and/or Chinese) appears to be inappropriate for AMOS software computation.

The above-mentioned studies seek to develop an ultimate measurement for a Taiwanese/Chinese identity, and the results look promising. However, the frameworks used are overly complicated for operation and replication by researchers using telephone or face-to-face surveys. Hence, the models have established barely incorporate cross-disciplinary dialogue and the external validity is thus weakened as well.

Since most empirical studies draw heavily from nationalism theory (i.e. are theory-laden), they overlook the multi-faceted content of the concept and adopt a dichotomous, exclusive definition of "consciousness" corresponding with a single measurement (Taiwanese vs. Chinese). This assumes that a single indicator can measure abstract national identity perfectly, yet neglects the components and salience of Taiwanese/Chinese identity. This oversimplified measurement implies that a number of current studies neglect identity complexity: the degree of overlap between identities of individuals perceiving themselves belonging to differing groups (Levy 2008; 2014; Roccas and Brewer 2002).

Ernst Hass (1964, 465) defines a nation as "a socially mobilized body of individuals, believing themselves to be united by some set of characteristics that differentiate them (in their
nor Chinese. People with a dual identity were separated into Chinese First and Taiwan First. Huang then applied measurements: a "collective self-esteem" scale, "right-wing authoritarianism," "social dominance theory," "national ideology," and "national future imagination (independence/unification)." She established factors from the results of these surveys and then analyzed the causal relations between these factors by structural equation analysis.

own minds) from ‘outsiders,’ and striving to create or maintain their own state.” One way in which nationalism differs from national identity is that the former explicitly concerns collective action rather than just shared belief or attitudes. This study thus attempts to use these social psychological-theoretical implications to illuminate the content of the Taiwanese/Chinese identity.

II. An Analytic Model for Taiwanese/Chinese Identity

1. Building an analytical model inspired by Abdelal et al.’s idea of social identity

I draw the concept of “social identity” from social psychology to develop a theoretically grounded measure of Taiwanese/Chinese identity. It includes five key dimensions: social identity, social structure (structural relations among groups), identity content (value defined by specific norms and attributes), strength of identification (individuals tend to identify strongly with some groups and weakly with other groups), and context (Kreindler et al. 2012, 340-350).

Social identity is realized via experimental results, called the “minimal group” paradigm, which argues that humans have a predisposition to make categorizations (Tajfel et al. 1971). Tajfel (1972, 292) defines social identity cognitively as “the individual’s knowledge that he belongs to certain social groups together with some emotional and value significance to him of this group membership.”

Social identity has three main components: social categorization, identification, and social comparison (Billig 2003; Tajfel 1974; Tajfel and Turner 1979). Social categorization is a cognitive shortcut at the individual level which functionally simplifies the complex social world and is associated with thinking and belief. It classifies specific objects and events together to distinguish one category from another (i.e. defines in-groups and out-groups).

Identification is the process that makes individuals associate themselves with certain groups. Specifically, it includes “identification as” (e.g. I am Taiwanese) and the state of being (e.g. strength), “identification with” (e.g. I am more or less intensively attached to Taiwanese and/or Chinese) (Cram 2012, 72). This involves a “depersonalization” process depending on the strength of the social identity and whether it is a matter of a collective self-construct “we” and “us” versus “they” (Hogg 2006), rather than individual characteristics or inter-personal relationships, as, for example, a soldier in a war (Tajfel and Turner 1979).

Social comparison is the process for producing and maintaining a positive social position. Hogg (2006) argues that social comparison is based on self-enhancement, striving for positive distinctiveness, and uncertainty reduction, and facilitates individuals using social identity as a prediction of “others” intentions and behaviors. Hence, those who hold a strong social identity are more inclined to maximize in-group similarities and out-group differences “to differentiate their own groups positively from others to achieve a positive social identity (Turner et al. 1987, 42).” In other words, social identity is a belief that “‘we’ are better than ‘them’ in every possible way” (Hogg 2006, 120).

National identity is “a subjective or internalized sense of belonging to the nation and measure it with questions that typically assess social identities” (Huddy and Khatib 2007, 65). Its relational content (e.g. attachment) is a crucial determinant of attitude (e.g. in-group-favoritism or out-group hostility) toward outsiders (Schildkraut 2010). A number of national identity studies adopt the social identity perspective in exploring issues such as European identity, foreign policy, and immigration (Chernyha and Burg 2012; Cram 2012; Flesken 2014; Freyburg and Richter 2008; Hatemi et al. 2013; Hopkins and Reicher 1996; Huddy and Khatib 2007; Kaina and Karolewski 2009; Levy 2014; McGuire et al. 1978; Reicher 2004; Tajfel 1981; Wright 2011). Taiwan studies (e.g. Chuang 2003) is testing the moderating effect of prejudgment of social identity on attitude towards Cross-Strait exchange.

For this complex concept, Abdelal et al. (2006; 2009) provides a conceptual guide which not only clarifies its meanings but also strengthens its analytical possibilities. The conceptual framework first suggests social identity varies along two dimensions: content and contestation. Social identity is broken down into four non-mutually exclusive constructs: (1) constitutive norms, the formal and informal rules of in-group-membership; (2) social purposes, the shared objectives of in-group-members; (3) relational comparisons, the way in-group traits are defined by reference to other identity groups; and (4) cognitive models, the worldviews associated with subjective interpretation shaped by a particular identity. Contestation refers to the degree of individual agreement within a group over the content of the shared identity.

These four content items are mutually inclusive. As Citrin and Sears (2009) argue, people perceive themselves as belonging to groups and pursue their shared goals through membership in these groups. Political purposes such as political independence, securing representation, or obtaining symbolic recognition for prior achievements unify the group membership and act as group boundaries. Abdelal et al’s ideas have increasingly been adopted in studies of national

identity (Cheng 2012; Dupré 2012; Godzimirski 2008; Herrera and Kraus 2012; Hintz 2013; Oren 2010; Weber 2014).

However, Seawright (2011) observes that Abdelal’s framework overlooks the affective component of identity. Seawright adds that it “covers a great deal of ground and may be expected to spark much needed debate about how best connect divergent theoretical account” (Seawright 2011, 455). The framework embraces role theory, nationalistic theory, and social identity theory.

For the first question of Abdelal’s framework, Weber (2014) has shown how to operationalize “emotional attachment” as “Pride in Europe,” “Satisfaction with Europe,” “Happiness with Europe.” Close-ended questions in an individual-level survey which are able to measure the salience of attitudes and cognition are demonstrated in Lieberman and Singh (2012).

For the second question, all theoretical accounts are closely related to cognitive models (i.e. stereotypes). The cognitive model, a “group’s ontology and epistemology” (Abdelal et al. 2006, 699), discerns what is good and bad about belonging to a particular national membership and internalizes such stereotypes as social norms and/or creates group goals in the context (Flesken 2014). Cheng (2012) and Weber (2014) similarly argue that cognitive orientations are more or less implied across all content of social identity. Therefore, this view of social cognition facilitates inter-theoretical ramifications.

Because this paper explores the meanings and components of Taiwanese/Chinese identity, I summarize these elements from nationalist researchers in my model (Anderson 1991; Gellner 1983; Joireman 2003): common culture, memory, language, kinship, and proper names for measuring the content of Taiwanese/Chinese identity. The following section describes the connection between the identified content and the revised theoretical framework.

2. The analytical model of Taiwanese/Chinese identity and its indicators

The model I established is extended and revised from Abdelal et al. (2009). I retained the three constructs and renamed them national norms, national closeness, and national purposes. These are treated as independent variables in this study. For the contestation dimension, I use close-ended, graded questions.⁹ This is because the survey method not only captures the strength of identity (Brady and Kaplan 2009) but also accounts for real-world political identities outside of

⁹ This study does not separately deal with the content of cognitive model because it is implied in all other content and items I used, and the questionnaire I adopted has no item associated with respondents’ views of historical events or figures.

the laboratory context even if it is merely a cross-section survey (Levy 2014, 627-628).

For the construct of Taiwanese/Chinese identity as an abstract psychological attachment to a political community, I adopted a latent variable (i.e. an ideal ontology) approach to tangibly address different observable characteristics in each abstract, unobservable construct. Different from using single indicator that presumes to perfectly measure an abstract concept without consideration of measurement error (Levy 2008, 12), latent variables assume that two or more imperfect indicators of the same phenomenon with different sources of error enable enhanced reliability (Brewer, Campbell, and Crano 1970, 3). The current study uses a group of observable, exchangeable indicators to reflect (i.e. reflective indicator) the property of the latent variable. This view of the latent variable assumes that observable indicators are totally caused by the latent variable (Slaney and Racine 2013). This is thus an alternative approach that complements identity research in political science and refines the indicators of Taiwanese/Chinese identity.

To develop the measurement, I adopted Brady and Kaplan's categorization (Brady and Kaplan 2009). The first category consists of constitutive norms and relational comparisons including: categories (e.g. intersubjective agreement on social identity), features (e.g. language usage, skin color, ethnicity, language, religion, and even income), and attachment to categories, interaction with members of the group, positive evaluation of the in-group, and a negative evaluation of the out-group. The second category is composed of social purposes (i.e. group goal) and cognitive models (i.e. meanings for each group's social identity).

In addition, to perform a validity test for the independent latent variables I adopted, I set the construct "state identity" as a dependent latent variable to establish the measurement model and the structural model. I therefore constructed 12 indicators for the three independent latent variables and 5 indicators for the dependent variable "state identity."

(1) Operationalizing "Taiwanese/Chinese identity"

(i) *National norms*

National norms refer to the habitual atmosphere that shapes how individuals classify themselves into particular national groups. The normative content, as defined by Citrin and Sears (2009), includes the physical features, values, and behaviors of a prototypical member of group. It applies to national distinctions such as language usage, skin color, ethnicity, language, religion, and even income, and depends on the intersubjective agreement on social identities (Brady and Kaplan 2009). I thus identified four hold-variance-items: "nation sameness," "culture sameness," "using Taiwanese language" and "blood linkage."

The first indicator is “national sameness.” This relates to one’s imagination, similar to Anderson’s idea of “imagined community” (1991) about the membership of a nation, and can be changed across time, space, and events. The Chinese nation can be an example. “Chinese” is a concept which includes Han peoples and other ethnic groups in the same nation (Wang 2001); and has been inculcated into Taiwanese students through political education as a political legitimization strategy of the Republic of China. However, this internalized norm has been challenged since President Lee Teng-hui’s “New Taiwanese” proposal in the 1990s, which sparked a new imagination of “Taiwanese” (Wu 2002). The item I adopted is “Do you agree that Taiwanese people and those in China belong to the same nation?”

Second, I use “culture sameness” as the second indicator. Chinese culture (i.e. Confucian culture), as the content of re-sinicization in ruling KMT party political education (Huang 2011; Huang 2007; 2010), is assumed to correspond with political China (Li 2003; Pan and Xu, 2007). Since democratization and localization began in the 1980s, skepticism of the view of the superiority of Chinese culture and the greatness of the Chinese nation have appeared historical textbooks. Today’s textbooks instead strengthen the content of local subjectivity and particularity (Chen 2012; Sung and Yang 2009). Cheng (2012) argues that culture is a boundary but also a relational connection, a view regarding cultural that may be inclusive or exclusive of “Chinese culture” or “Taiwanese culture.” I adopted the question as “Do you think the contents of Taiwanese culture and Chinese culture are exactly the same, mostly the same, mostly different, or totally different?”

“Using Taiwanese language” is the third indicator. This is because language is an easy way for individuals to distinguish in-group fellows from others (Chang 2011), since a common culture can be defined by language (Joireman 2003). Language usage, as Chen and Cheng (2003) indicate, is one of the factors correlated with selection of national identity. Hence, a group may prefer to speak a particular language in a particular cultural context. Therefore, identity orientation can be indicated by language usage. Unlike the past when speakers of Taiwanese language in schools would be fined, today the government is promoting mother language education in schools as a means to cultivate “Taiwanese” identity and thereby enhance “Taiwanese” self-esteem, which was suppressed in the period of KMT authoritarian rule (Chen 2012). I thus adopted the item, “Do you agree that we should use Taiwanese as the primary language in Taiwan?”

The fourth indicator fitting this type is “blood linkage.” Blood linkages are commonly

used a basic indicator in empirical study (Chen 2012; Chen, Keng, Cheng, and Yu 2009; Chen, Keng, Tu, and Huang 2009; Keng, Liu, and Chen 2009; Li 2003; Li and Lee 2003). National identity can be defined across various sociodemographic groups based on age, race, or ethnicity as a “self-awareness of one’s objective membership in the group and a psychological sense of attachment to the group” (Huddy 2001, 141). This concept is commonly used in essentialist approaches to identity studies but is unavoidably involved in the constructivist viewpoint called “lineage nepotism” (cited by Li 2003, 43). The ancestors of many modern Taiwanese residents emigrated from China in the 17th and 18th centuries. Hence, people living in Taiwan may see themselves as having a blood linkage with the Han people (Chen 2012). For example, Taiwan president Ma claimed to be a Chinese in the 2012 presidential election. However, since human memory may fade, as Anderson (1991) noted, people may care more about their home in Taiwan than their ancestral homes in China. In addition, at present, the registration of ancestral homes in China is not shown on identity cards (Chen 2012), which weakens the recognition of blood ties. Therefore, Taiwanese residents have become less emotionally linked to the conventional idea of Taiwanese and Chinese compatriotism. I thus used the item, “Do you agree that mainlanders are our compatriots?”

I used the above indicators to show the variances in national, culture, and language linkage-identity. Nevertheless, political boundaries are vague when based only on these attributes. For example, an individual of mixed-race parentage may self-identify as black or Latino for racial but not for political categories (Huddy 2001).

(ii) *National closeness*

National closeness, which is similar to relational comparisons, is defined as the aspect of one’s self shared with a specified set of boundaries of group membership through social comparison (Citrin and Sears 2009). This construct covers two features: “attachment to categories” (individuals committed to groups in which they hold memberships) and “positive evaluation of the in-group, negative evaluation of the out-group” (Brady and Kaplan 2009). I thus constructed four indicators: “national superiority,” “attachment to international competition,” “Intermarriage with Mainlanders,” and “policy limitations on tourists from China.”

The first indicator, “national superiority,” measures “positive evaluation of the in-group.” This concept is associated with ethnocentrism generated by individuals socially comparing themselves with individuals in other groups in order to maintain a positive self-grouping and avoid anxiety in daily life (Deaux, Wrightsman, and Dane 1993; Hogg 2006). People believe that

out-group members are different from in-group members and are bad and wrong (McDermott 2009). A common usage in daily speech representing in-group positive positions is identifying in-group children as superior to out-group children. The question for this indicator is “Do you agree that Taiwanese children perform better than those in China?”

“Attachment to international competition” is taken as the second indicator for measuring “attachment to categories.” This indicator is associated with the concept of “inclusion of other in the self,” which defined as an individual’s “sense of being interconnected with another” (Aron, Aron, and Smollan 1992, 598). This concept occurs in sports teams determined by feelings of closeness and similarity as well (Platow et al. 1999, as cited in Winterich, Mittal, and Ross 2009). Hence, I posit that this may occur with respect to international sports, such as the Baseball World Cup and the Olympics, which have been considered a research field for showing how the national identity and country identity of Taiwanese athletes manifested itself (Bairner and Hwang 2011; Lin 2012). The item I used is “Do you feel happier when our national sports delegations beat the mainland delegations in international competitions than when we beat teams from other countries?”

“Intermarriage with Mainlanders” is taken as the third indicator of tendencies toward inter-group relationships (Wu 2002). As shown earlier, respondents who have negative attitudes toward Chinese are less willing to conduct economic or cultural exchanges with Mainlanders (Chuang 2003). I posit that this also occurs with intermarriage. An item regarding the intermarriage of respondents’ offspring with Mainlanders could thus be an indicator of whether the respondents perceive and desire to keep a closer relationship with Mainlanders. I use the item, “Could you accept your relatives, such as your son or daughter, marrying Mainlanders?”

“Policy limitations on tourists from China” is the fourth indicator. The original idea was stimulated by a series of anti-Mainland tourist incidents in Hong Kong. The open policy, one of the integration strategies from China government, attempts to strengthen “Chinese” identity in Hong Kong, but unexpectedly spurred the Hong Kong people to more strongly self-identify as “Hong Kongers.” Similar to the view of social identity, Hong Kongers used a “social creativity” strategy under which they shift the group boundary from past economic superiority complex to prejudice, using, for example, the negative image of mainland tourists’ “uncivilized” behaviors (e.g. spitting), in order to preserve their social status. This leads citizens to request a restrictive policy toward tourists from the Mainland (Zheng and Wan 2014). Around 57% of Hong Kong respondents agreed with reducing the quota of Mainland tourists (Hong Kong Institute of Asia Pacific Studies at Chinese University of Hong Kong 2015). A similar policy has also been

adopted by the China government toward Taiwan and has shown results similar to those of the Hong Kong case (Rowen 2014). It seems, as Chen, Chen, and Wang (2012) argue, that the affective factor overcomes the apparent interest factor. Consequently, anti-Mainland tourist campaigns have also occurred in Taiwan (*The Liberty Times*, March 18, 2015).¹⁰ The question I used is “Do you agree that our government should implement more restrictive policies toward mainland Chinese tourists?”

(iii) *National purposes*

Abdelal et al. (2009, 23) argue that the cultivation of group identity itself is a purpose and that it is “coterminous with the boundaries of the nation and autonomous from a relationally defined other.” Functionally, the goal of group identity is related to justification and motivation for power, status, and resource allocations. Group identities can make members “willing to discriminate in favor of their own group and against out-groups even if it is costly to them” (Brady and Kaplan 2009, 35). The manifest political purpose of Taiwanese is escaping from the Chinese sphere of influence and fighting for international recognition (Chen, Keng, Tu, and Huang 2009). I thus constructed four indicators of national purposes: “state building,” “promotion of Taiwanese cultural subjectivity,” “Name-rectification of the official name of Taiwan,” and “national domain.”

The first indicator is “state building.” The ultimate exclusion of the out-group is creating a separate political entity (Anderson 1991; Gellner 1983), that is, “Taiwanese running Taiwan” (Chen 2012) to achieve political autonomy. Hence, once the “Taiwanese identity” established, Taiwanese will likely want to establish a sovereign state (Wu 2005). In fact, this idea has become mainstream since the assertion of the “special state to state relationship” in 1999 and of “one country on each side” in 2002. As a result, the contestation of Taiwanese/Chinese identity boundary has been extended to state identity (Cheng 2012). I hence used the item, “Do you agree that Taiwan should establish a self-ruled country?”

“Promotion of Taiwanese cultural subjectivity” is taken as the second indicator. A nation should have its own cultural origin including a local language, history, and literature (Anderson 1991; Gellner 1983; Schermerhorn 1974). People in Taiwan interested in building a Taiwanese nation should sympathize with the promotion of local culture education, such as teaching grassroots literature, to purposely shape Taiwanese “subjectivity.” I used the question, “To establish

¹⁰ Jia-lin Huang, 2015, “Chinese Tourists Filled Siziwan,” *The Liberty Times*, March 18, <http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/paper/863839> (accessed December 25, 2015).

cultural subjectivity in Taiwan, elementary and secondary schools should promote local culture education. Do you agree?”

“Identifying with Taiwan” should be taken as the third indicator. Brady and Kaplan (2009, 35) state that “each group, especially its elites, constructs meanings about the group’s status and relationship to other groups.” In 1998 then President Lee Teng-hui proposed the idea of “New Taiwanese.” The core of this idea is that no matter where you are from originally, you are Taiwanese as long as you identify with the land of Taiwan. It highlights state identification with democratic “Taiwan,” rather than the authoritarian China, in order to put those Mainlanders living in Taiwan into an in-group “New Taiwanese” category. I thus adopted the item, “Do you agree that those identifying with Taiwan can be called Taiwanese?”

The fourth indicator is “national domain.” A nation should affectively correspond with a territory (Joireman 2003; Smith 1991). This is a “state mind” held by the members of the nation, and reflects the geopolitical cognition of national sovereignty (Anderson 1991). Since the de facto jurisdiction of the Republic of China only covers Taiwan and a few islands off the coast of China and in the South China Sea, this may shape the “state mind” of Taiwan residents. I thus constructed the item “Do you agree that travelling to Hong Kong or Shanghai can be seen as going abroad?”

(2) Operationalization of State identity

Citrin and Sears (2009, 147) say that “one can call oneself an American without feeling strongly patriotic or believing that nationality is fundamental to one’s self-concept.” Thus, this study explores the interface between national identity and state identity (Sidanius et al. 1997).

State loyalties (e.g. symbolic patriotism or national pride), generated from national identity (Huddy and Khatib 2007), define the other relationally to achieve autonomy and self-esteem in the state name. Five indicators are thus adopted: “The proper name of the state (R.O.C.),” “The pride of being a national (R.O.C.),” “Name rectification of the Taiwan official name,” “democratic unification,” and “unconditional unification.”

The first one could be classified as normative content called “the proper of name” of the state (R.O.C.). A proper name for the state is a key component of Taiwanese/Chinese identity (Joireman 2003). Yet, the name is not only a label or symbol but also a kind of self-identity. While the current official name is Republic of China, the state has only limited international recognition since it left the United Nations in 1972. Another official designation in the international field is “The Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu.” In fact, the name, “Taiwan,” is commonly used since the R.O.C. has control only over Taiwan

and a few islands, as noted above. As a representation of self-identity, the legitimacy of the official name is thus contested in Taiwan. I thus constructed the item “Do you agree that the ‘Republic of China’ is the formal name of our country?”

I take “the pride in being national” as the second indicator. Pride of state or patriotism is related to the attachment toward the state (Huddy and Khatib 2007), which can be seen as a relational content as well. People who feel proud of being nationals believe that their nationality brings a higher social status. This indicator is commonly used in the “Taiwan Social Change Survey.” I thus used “Do you agree that we should proud of being nationals of Republic of China?”

“Name rectification of the Taiwan official name” is the third indicator. Different from the “the proper name,” the renaming movement creates a new goal for group members. Group members expect that others will understand them by this self-defined name (Shi 2002). The Name Rectification Movement launched by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administration (2000-2008), for example, has led to policy changes, such as adding the characters “Taiwan” to the cover of the “Republic of China” passport and returning the original name of the post office to “Taiwan Post” from “Chunghwa Post” in order to arouse the Taiwanese national identity (Chang 2008; Lai 2007; Shi 2002). I used the item “Do you agree that ‘Taiwan’ is the formal name of our country?”

Of “Independence/Unification preference,” it is also regarded as purported content due to such preferences implying changing status quo. To measure the strength and differences in state identity, I took “unconditional unification” as the fourth indicator, “Do you agree that Taiwan and Mainland should be finally unified?” The reason is that “unconditional unification” as a situational cue may trigger the implicit consciousness of those respondents who self-identify as “Chinese” respondents, to test the strength of Chinese identity (Jiang 1998).


Furthermore, similarly to test the strength of those who self-identify as “Taiwanese” (Jiang 1998; Li 2003), I take “democratic unification” as the fifth indicator. This idea is extracted from the R.O.C. government’s official document called “Guidelines for National Unification.” In view of social identity, democratic institution seen as a common ground to demarcate the inter-group line by which political identity is established among states (Hayes 2012). I thus used “Are you willing to reunify with the Mainland if the political institutions of Taiwan and the Mainland are democratic institutions?”

In addition to the above-mentioned latent variables, I additionally adopted four variables,

age, education, gender, and social contacts in order to test the moderating effect.¹¹

III. Data and Measurement Specification

As an echo to the recent trend of methodology calling for measurements that facilitate cross-disciplinary dialogue and lead to the systematic construction of indicators (Abdelal et al. 2006, 695-696), this study adopts the three types of identity constructs, national norms (NN), national closeness (NC), and national purposes (NP) as latent variables, to examine the meaning of a Taiwanese/Chinese identity. State identity is assumed to be a consequence of national identity. I expect that the three latent variables of Taiwanese/Chinese identity have a significant positive correlation with state identity (SI). Moreover, I reveal the heterogeneity in the model and then explore the different traits of respondents self-identifying as Taiwanese (T respondents) and respondents self-identifying as Chinese (C respondents), and both (B respondents). Finally the moderating effects of age, education, gender, and social contacts (SC) on state identity would be examined as well. The model is shown in Figure 1.



Source: By author.

Figure 1 The Analytic Model

¹¹ “Social contacts” is grounded in the “construct hypothesis” of Chen, Keng, Cheng, and Yu (2009). Social contacts can ease inter-group enmity and develop positive attitude towards out-groups through exchanges (Deaux, Wrightsman, and Dane 1993).

As summarized in Table 1, the 17 indicators were categorized into the four latent variables and were measured on five-point scales from strongly agree to strongly disagree; I rescaled some indicators to fit directional consistency for computing requirements.¹²

Table 1 The Subjective Meaning of State Identity

State identity	Taiwanese	Both	Chinese
Name rectification of the official name of Taiwan	81.9% or 448	59.9% or 246	30.4% or 14
Unconditional reunification	17.7% or 94	47.4% or 184	52.4% or 22
Democratic reunification	33.7% or 172	66.1% or 257	71.0% or 32
The proper of name of the state (R.O.C.)	73.2% or 402	93.2% or 396	93.8% or 41
The pride in being R.O.C. nationals	76.3% or 418	91.1% or 387	91.3% or 42

Source: Liu (2012b).

Note: The percentage represents the ratio of “agree,” and “strongly agree;” and the number represents the absolute number of those who self-identify as “Taiwanese,” “Chinese,” and “Both.”

These indicators were edited into a survey questionnaire. A telephone survey was conducted from January 23 to February 4, 2013, using the telephone survey center of a research university in Taiwan. The population was eligible voters over 20 years of age. Sampling was based on the telephone book published by Chung-Hua Telecom in 2010. The computer-assisted telephone interview (CATI) system removes the last two digits of all telephone numbers and replaces them with a full set of 100 double-digit figures from 00 to 99. Specific numbers were then randomly selected from the database by computers. Finally, 1,078 interviews were completed. The response rate was 21.56%, following formula 3 of the American Association of Public Opinion Research (AAPOR). Based on the population information for 2012, ranking weights were applied to the sample to ensure that the distributions for sample age, gender, and education level did not substantially differ from those for the total population.

This study employed PLS-SEM approach to measure Taiwanese/Chinese identity.¹³ PLS-

¹² Such indicators are “Using the Taiwanese language (V9)” for “national norms;” “national superiority (V10),” “Policy limitations on tourists from mainland China (V22),” “Tendency to interact with in-group (V16),” and “Intermarriage with Mainlanders (V25)” for “national closeness;” “Identifying Taiwan (V17),” “State building (V23),” “Promotion of Taiwanese cultural subjectivity (V26),” “National domain (V31)” for “national purposes;” “Name-correction of the official name of Taiwan (V28)” for “state identity.”

¹³ The analytic tool I adopted is SmartPLS 3 provided by Ringle, Wende, and Becker (2015). For more information, see <http://www.smartpls.com>. In addition to descriptive statistics, this paper uses imputed

SEM is a statistical technique of Structural Equation Modeling, which is integrated by principle component analysis and multiple regression and thus good at prediction. This approach is appropriately for theoretical testing and theoretical development (Hair et al. 2014). Next, PLS-SEM allows me to model the observable variables as latent constructs. Third, PLS-SEM provides validity test simultaneously for measurement model as well as process causal path analysis for structural model. Third, PLS-SEM provides multi-group analysis (PLS-MGA) to identify and understand group differences.

This study processes the analysis using SmartPLS software 3.2.3 version. In the analysis, this study uses PLS Algorithm, bootstrapping (2000 subsamples), blindfolding, and PLS-MGA to estimate the model validity.

IV. Findings

1. Descriptive statistics

Different wordings and conditions might lead to different answers, and the same word may have different meanings for different respondents. To give an example, the meaning of maintaining the “status quo” to some is independence, while for others it signals unification (Keng, Liu, and Chen 2009). Therefore, I use cross-tabulation to show the subjective meaning of state identity for T respondents, C respondents, and B respondents.

As Appendix A shows, this study found that the majority (52.1% or 562) said they are Taiwanese, 40.0% or 431 respondents said “both,” and only 4.3% or 46 respondents said they are Chinese. The remaining 3.7% or 39 respondents said “don’t know,” “hard to say” or refused to answer. T respondents have the highest agreement (81.9% answered “agree” and “strongly agree”) with renaming the official name with Taiwan in contrast to B respondents (59.9%) and C respondents (30.4%). Next, the number of T respondents agreeing with “unconditional unification” is much smaller than B respondents (47.4%) and C respondents (52.4%). Even with the cue of democratic unification given, only 33.7% T respondents agreed, much lower than B respondents (66.1%) and C respondents (71%). While 73.2% of T respondents agreed with the R.O.C. as the current official name, this was lower than the number of T respondents supporting

data (nearest-neighbor mean imputation) in processing the PLS-SEM analysis in order to decrease the biased results caused by missing values.

renaming the state Taiwan, considerably lower than B respondents (93.2%) and C respondents (93.8%) on this question. Similarly, 76.3% of T respondents feeling pride in being R.O.C. national is separately smaller than 91.1% of B respondents and 91.3% of C respondents.

In brief, these findings echo those of previous studies (e.g. Liu 2012a) in which respondents self-identifying as “Taiwanese” tend to favor Taiwan independence and oppose unification, while respondents self-identifying as “both” and “Chinese” tend to favor R.O.C. and unification. For other descriptive analyses, see Appendix A.

2. Measurement model specification

I begin with the measurement model. I first test the internal consistency reliability (composite reliability, CR), then the convergent validity, and finally, the discriminant validity.

Table 2 shows that the CR values for all latent variables passed the 0.7 threshold. The CR values of the constructs, which range from 0.718 to 0.776, are all acceptable. The Cronbach’s α of the constructs all exceed 0.5 (medium to high reliability) (Nunally and Bernstein 1994).¹⁴ Most indicator loadings are higher than 0.5, meaning that such items have acceptable item reliability except for “Identifying Taiwan” (0.477). However, I retain it, as Hair et al. (2014) suggested, in that the indicator (loadings around 0.4 to 0.7) does not weaken the average variance extracted (AVE) value, CR and content validity.¹⁵

Next, convergent validities for the four latent variables range between 0.412 and 0.556, the acceptable range in the case of an AVE value of 0.4 and a CR value of over 0.6 (Fornell and Larcker 1981).

¹⁴ Cronbach’s alpha assumes all indicators are equally reliable (equal outer loadings), whereas PLS-SEM apply composite reliability (CR) which focuses on indicators’ individual reliability. This treatment considers the different indicator variables’ outer loadings and thus avoids the tendency to underestimate (Hair et al. 2014).

¹⁵ This study explores other potentially useful indicators of the content of Taiwanese/Chinese identity. However such indicators factors as “Chinese cultural orthodoxy,” “understanding Taiwanese language,” “Negative image of Mainlanders,” “Charitable donation based on attachment,” “pride of democracy” are below 0.4. Such indicators with very low loadings should always be eliminated as Hair et al. (2014) recommended. I eliminated them.

Table 2 Results Summary for the Reflective Measurement Model

Latent Variable	Indicators	PLS Algorithm		CR	AVE	Cronbach's Alpha			
		Outer Loadings	Outer Weights						
National norms (NN)	National sameness	0.766	0.435	0.758	0.446	0.578			
	Blood linkage	0.757	0.413						
	Using the Taiwanese language	0.602	0.374						
	Culture sameness	0.510	0.252						
National closeness (NC)	Policy limitations on tourists from mainland	0.717	0.427	0.749	0.429	0.557			
	Intermarriage with Mainlanders	0.710	0.439						
	National superiority	0.630	0.350						
	Attachment to international competitions	0.549	0.293						
National purposes (NP)	State building	0.818	0.572	0.731	0.416	0.537			
	Promotion of Taiwanese cultural subjectivity	0.692	0.379						
	National domain	0.535	0.302						
	Identifying Taiwan	0.477	0.226						
State identity (SI)	Name-rectification of the official name of Taiwan	0.690	0.419	0.776	0.412	0.655			
	Unconditional reunification	0.690	0.330						
	Democratic reunification	0.681	0.325						
	The proper of name of the state	0.610	0.261						
	The pride of being nationals	0.522	0.200						
	Age	1.000	1.000				1.000	1.000	1.000
	Education	1.000	1.000				1.000	1.000	1.000
Gender	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000				
Social contacts (SC)	Traveling to Mainland	0.853	0.779	0.718	0.566	0.244			
	Relatives staying in Mainland	0.636	0.527						

Source: SmartPLS 3 (Ringle, Wende, and Becker 2015).

Third, each latent variable exhibits discriminant validity. Discriminant validity means that a construct is truly distinct from others using an empirical standard. It may be evaluated in three ways: via Cronbach's α , the Fornell-Larcker criterion, and the heterotrait-monotrait ratio of correlations (HTMT). As Table 3 illustrates, the Cronbach's α (shown in italics) of each latent variable is greater than all of its highest correlation values with any others. These cross loadings show acceptable discriminant validity (Gaski and Nevin 1985).

The Fornell-Larcker criterion states that the latent variable's AVE square root should be

greater than all of its cross loading values (Fornell and Larcker 1981). The results in Table 3, where the values for all latent variables are 0.667 (NN), 0.655 (NC), 0.645 (NP), 0.642 (SI), and 0.752 (SC), meet this criterion.

The HTMT is a newly introduced value claiming more reliable evaluation of discriminant validity. An HTMT value below 0.9 represents that discriminant validity has been established (Henseler, Ringle, and Sarstedt 2015). The latent variables used in this study meet that threshold.

Table 3 Discriminant Validity Analysis

Constructs	National Norms	National Closeness	National Purposes	State Identity	Social Contacts	CR	AVE
National norms	0.667					0.758	0.446
National closeness	0.442 HTMT _{0.695}	0.655				0.749	0.429
National purposes	0.458 HTMT _{0.775}	0.458 HTMT _{0.736}	0.645			0.731	0.416
State identity	0.562 HTMT _{0.895}	0.423 HTMT _{0.648}	0.530 HTMT _{0.754}	0.642		0.776	0.412
Social contacts	0.137 HTMT _{0.358}	0.183 HTMT _{0.493}	0.097 HTMT _{0.267}	0.123 HTMT _{0.289}	0.752	0.718	0.566
Cronbach's Alpha	<i>0.578</i>	<i>0.557</i>	<i>0.537</i>	<i>0.655</i>	<i>0.244</i>		

Source: SmartPLS 3 (Ringle, Wende, and Becker 2015).

3. Structural model specification

The structural model provides a model fit test and path analysis. I adopted the model testing from Hair et al. (2014) as follows: the value of collinearity (VIF), structural model path coefficient and total effect, coefficient of determination (R^2), effect size (f^2) predictive relevance (Q^2), and the standardized root mean square (SRMR).

The variance accounted for (VIF) checks whether the constructs have collinearity issues. The VIF standard should be higher than 0.2 and lower than 0.5. The values for all latent variables are 1.502 (NN), 1.456 (NC), 1.436 (NP), 1.122 (SC), 1.277 (age), 1.318 (education), and 1.053 (gender). The model has no collinearity issues.

The path coefficient estimates the inter-construct relationships. The path coefficient values, as Table 4 shows in bold letters, are 0.359 (NN->SI), 0.137 (NC->SI), and 0.293 (NP->SI) with high statistical significance. However, the moderators (i.e. "age," "education," "gender," "SC")

are not significantly related to SI. This result confirms that national norms, national closeness, and national purposes, are each positively correlated with state identity.

Table 4 Inter-Group Comparison of Total Effects and Outer Weights

	Path coefficients/Total effects				Outer weights				P Values/ Significance level			
	All groups	Taiwanese	Both	Chinese	All groups	Taiwanese	Both	Chinese	All groups	Taiwanese	Both	Chinese
Age -> State identity	-0.015	0.025	-0.072	-0.212	1.000				0.585	0.568	0.158	0.281
Moderating effect												
National Purposes * Age -> State identity			-0.136								0.025**	
National closeness * Age -> State identity			-0.006								0.906*	
National norms * Age -> State identity		0.094								0.050**		
Education -> State identity	-0.011	0.021	-0.070	-0.081	1.000				0.674	0.606	0.178	0.613
Moderating effect												
National Purposes * Education -> State identity		0.093								0.043**		
National norms * Education -> State identity		0.079								0.088*		
Gender -> State identity	0.027	-0.024	0.089	-0.062	1.000				0.290	0.549	0.056*	0.709
National Purposes -> State identity	0.293	0.271	0.343	0.251					0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.244
State building					0.818	0.618	0.586	0.478				
Promotion of Taiwanese cultural subjectivity					0.692	0.356	0.419	0.557				
National domain					0.535	0.247	0.389	0.146				
Identifying Taiwan					0.477	0.299	0.149	0.223				
National closeness -> State identity	0.137	0.156	0.121	-0.028					0.000***	0.000***	0.014**	0.902*
Policy limitations on tourists from mainland China					0.427	0.428	0.495	0.553				
Intermarriage with Mainlanders					0.439	0.500	0.385	0.283				
National superiority					0.350	0.306	0.290	0.410				
Attachment to international competitions					0.293	0.302	0.409	0.160				
National norms -> State identity	0.359	0.258	0.227	0.671					0.000***	0.000***	0.004***	0.001***
National sameness					0.435	0.418	0.488	0.493				
Blood linkage					0.413	0.454	0.456	0.350				
Using Taiwanese language					0.374	0.437	0.419	0.471				
Culture sameness					0.252	0.249	0.292	0.046				
State identity												
Name-rectification of the official name of Taiwan					0.690	0.458	0.613	0.323				
Unconditional reunification					0.690	0.349	0.365	0.345				
Democratic reunification					0.681	0.285	0.378	0.496				
The proper of name of the state					0.610	0.287	0.156	0.282				
The pride in being an ROC national					0.522	0.234	-0.018	0.244				
Social contacts -> State identity	0.012	0.061	0.039	0.161					0.618	0.111	0.417	0.386
Moderating effect												
National closeness * Social contacts -> State identity		0.001								0.982**		

Source: Ringle, Wende, and Becker (2015).

Note: PLS-MGA probability * $p < 0.1$ or $p > 0.9$, ** $p < 0.05$ or $p > 0.95$, *** $p < 0.01$ or $p > 0.99$.

Of the three constructs' strength, NN (0.359) has the strongest total effect (identical with the path coefficient value) on SI, followed by NP (0.293) and NC (0.137) (Table 4). NN thus appears to be the most powerful construct of "Taiwanese/Chinese identity." Specifically, the item "National sameness" has the highest outer weight (0.435) in the NN construct. This item is associated with the survey question "Do you agree that Taiwanese people and those in China belong to the same nation?" This implies that "national imagination" is the most influential component of self-categorization in Taiwan.

R^2 is the value that represents the structural model's predictive accuracy. It is the proportion of an endogenous construct's variance explained by its predictor constructs. However there is no certain rule of thumb for what is a good R^2 value because it is affected by the model complexity (e.g. R^2 values will increase as items are added) and the research field. Generally, R^2 around 0.19_{small}, 0.33_{medium}, or 0.67_{large} for endogenous latent variables can be a rough rule describing weak, moderate, or substantial explanatory power. The R^2 is 0.440 in this model, showing good explanatory power after taking into account how frequently low outer loadings are obtained because of sensitive survey questions in political fields (Hair et al. 2014).

The effect size (f^2) represents how much a predictor construct explains a target construct. Typically, f^2 values of around 0.02, 0.15, and 0.35 are assumed to represent small, medium, and large effects (Hair Jr et al. 2014). The result shows that NN has the strongest effect (0.153_{medium}), followed by NP (0.107_{small}), and NC (0.023_{small}).

Finally, Stonr-Geisser's value (Q^2) is a test of the model's predictive relevance. Q^2 values larger than zero for the reflective endogenous latent variable (state identity in this study) represent that the path model has a predictive relevance. The Q^2 value in this model is 0.164.

For goodness of fit (GoF), the fitness index the standardized root mean square (SRMR) measures the difference between the observed correlation and the predicted correlation in evaluating a structural model (Henseler, Ringle, and Sarstedt 2015). This model exhibits the satisfactory SRMR value of 0.057, where value below 0.10 is seen as having good fit.

Overall, the theoretical model constructed herein is acceptable. It clearly shows that "national norms," "national closeness," and "national purposes" are positively correlated with the state identity, while "national sameness" is the most important component of national norms.

The analysis below explores model heterogeneity for T respondents, C respondents, and B respondents.

4. The differences between Taiwanese and/or Chinese identity

Rather than analyzing the aggregate data set as the above-mentioned path-analysis, in this section we are interested in the differences among T respondents, C respondents, and B respondents using multi-group analysis. Thus, group as a categorical moderator variable allows us to realize some observable (e.g. gender, age) or unobservable group traits (e.g. identity) (Hair et al. 2014).

Table 5 shows in bold letters that two relationships (path coefficients) differ significantly across T respondents (0.258) and C respondents (0.671). The effect of NN on SI is significant lower for T respondents, implying that the normative factor plays a weaker role for T respondents than C respondents.

Conversely, the effect of NP on SI is significant higher for T respondents (0.271) than C respondents (0.251). This makes sense, since safeguarding a sovereign state status is a key component for T respondents, unlike C respondents.

Demographic factors of T and B respondents, including age, education, and gender, are different. Age is more influential for T respondents (0.025) than B respondents (-0.072). Cross-tabulation shows that the young (aged 20-29) represent 18% (145 T respondents), higher for T respondents than B respondents. For education level, T respondents' path coefficient (0.021) is significantly higher than B respondents (-0.070). The average education level of B respondents (college and above is 60.98% or 261; high school and below 39.01% or 167) is higher than T respondents (college and above is 50.89% or 284; high school and below 49.10% or 274). “Gender” differs as well across these two groups. Compared to B respondents (male, 46.63% or 201; female, 53.36% or 230), the percentage of female T respondents (male, 45.19% or 254; female, 54.80% or 308) is higher. The results also show that C respondents' NN path coefficient on SI (0.671) is significantly higher than that of B respondents (0.227), implying that normative thinking plays a greater role for C than B respondents.

Next, B respondents' path coefficient (-0.070) for education is significantly higher than C respondents (-0.081); B respondents' average education (college and above is 60.98%) is higher than C respondents (43.47%).

In sum, T respondents, C respondents, and B respondents groups differ in two key dimensions: national purposes and national norms. Age, education, and gender also differ for these groups.

Table 5 PLS-MGA and Parametric Test Results

	Taiwanese		Chinese		Taiwanese vs. Chinese		
	$p^{(1)}$	$se(p^{(1)})$	$p^{(2)}$	$se(p^{(2)})$	$ p^{(1)} - p^{(2)} $	Signif- icance level	P Value
Age -> State identity	0.025	0.043	-0.212	0.197	0.237		0.114
Education -> State identity	0.021	0.040	-0.081	0.159	0.102		0.263
Gender -> State identity	-0.024	0.040	-0.062	0.165	0.038		0.397
National Purposes -> State identity	0.271	0.045	0.251	0.216	0.019	*	0.453 (0.904 in parametric test)
National closeness -> State identity	0.156	0.040	-0.028	0.228	0.031		0.197
National norms -> State identity	0.258	0.046	0.671	0.209	0.246	**	0.972
Social contacts -> State identity	0.061	0.038	0.161	0.186	0.100		0.706
N	564		55				
	Taiwanese		Both		Taiwanese vs. Both		
	$p^{(1)}$	$se(p^{(1)})$	$p^{(2)}$	$se(p^{(2)})$	$ p^{(1)} - p^{(2)} $	Signif- icance level	P Value
Age -> State identity	0.025	0.043	-0.072	0.051	0.097	*	0.078
Education -> State identity	0.021	0.040	-0.070	0.052	0.091	*	0.085
Gender -> State identity	-0.024	0.040	0.089	0.046	0.113	**	0.969
National Purposes -> State identity	0.271	0.045	0.343	0.067	0.072		0.816
National closeness -> State identity	0.156	0.040	0.121	0.049	0.035		0.290
National norms -> State identity	0.258	0.046	0.227	0.080	0.031		0.319
Social contacts -> State identity	0.061	0.038	0.039	0.048	0.023		0.357
N	564		432				
	Both		Chinese		Chinese vs. Both		
	$p^{(1)}$	$se(p^{(1)})$	$p^{(2)}$	$se(p^{(2)})$	$ p^{(1)} - p^{(2)} $	Signif- icance level	P Value
Age -> State identity	-0.072	0.051	-0.212	0.197	0.140		0.770
Education -> State identity	-0.070	0.052	-0.081	0.159	0.011	*	0.529 (0.945 in parametric test)
Gender -> State identity	0.089	0.046	-0.062	0.165	0.150		0.823
National Purposes -> State identity	0.343	0.067	0.251	0.216	0.092		0.666
National closeness-> State identity	0.121	0.049	-0.028	0.228	0.149		0.752
National norms -> State identity	0.227	0.080	0.671	0.209	0.444	**	0.023
Social contacts -> State identity	0.039	0.048	0.161	0.186	0.070		0.325
N	432		55				

Source: Ringle, Wende, and Becker (2015).

Note: 1. $p^{(1)}$ and $p^{(2)}$ are path coefficients of “Taiwanese,” “Chinese,” “Both,” respectively; $se(p^{(1)})$ and $se(p^{(2)})$ are the standard error of $p^{(1)}$ and $p^{(2)}$, respectively.

2. PLS-MGA probability * $p < 0.1$ or $p > 0.9$, ** $p < 0.05$ or $p > 0.95$, *** $p < 0.01$ or $p > 0.99$.

Table 5 addresses the strength differences for the three groups via comparisons of total effect and outer weights. For T respondents, NP has the highest total effect value (0.271), followed by NN (0.258), and NC (0.156). Thus, national purpose is the most influential driver for these individuals. This construct’s indicator weights show that the indicator state building (0.618) has the highest outer weight (i.e. “cultural subjectivity,” 0.356, “identifying Taiwan,” 0.299, and “national domain,” 0.247). This item implies that T respondents tend to endorse establishing a self-ruled nation. Around 87% or 468 T respondents scored strongly agree and agree on this item, B respondents are second with 55.4% or 224, and C respondents are third with 43.2% or 19.

A similar pattern may be found for B respondents, where NP has the highest total effect value (0.343), followed by NN (0.227), and NC (0.121). However, compared to T respondents, the outer weight of state building (0.586) for B respondents is only moderately higher than that of other indicators (i.e. promotion of Taiwanese cultural subjectivity, 0.419, national domain, 0.389, and identifying Taiwan, 0.149).

Unlike T respondents and B respondents, C respondents stress NN (0.67), followed by NC (-0.028). NP (0.251) is not significant. The indicator national sameness (0.493) has a greater effect than other indicators (i.e. using Taiwanese language, 0.471, blood linkage, 0.350, and cultural sameness, 0.046). The survey question for this item is “Do you agree that Taiwanese people and those in China belong to the same nation?” The majority of Chinese (91.3% or 42) strongly agree or agree, while “Both” (90.6% or 385) generally agree. A minority of “Taiwanese” identifiers (64.4% or 352) agree with it. Thus, “Chinese” identifiers stress the factor of “national sameness” relating to “state identity.”

In sum, using multi-group analysis and comparison of total effect for T, C, and B respondents, there were significant differences between respondents self-identifying as Taiwanese and respondents self-identifying as Chinese in national purposes and national norms. Furthermore, those self-identifying as Taiwanese and as Both stress “state-building,” a component of the latent variable national purposes. Yet, the former take a pro-Taiwan and anti-unification stance, while the latter take a pro-“Republic of China” and pro-democratic unification stance.

This study also tests the moderator variable effect on the strength and path direction of one specific relationship between latent variables. Age has a significant moderating effect on the paths NN->SI and NC->SI for B respondents as well as the path NN->SI for T respondents. Next, education for T respondents has a moderating effect on the paths NP->SI and NN->SI.

Finally, SC has a moderating effect on the path NC->SI for T respondents. Nevertheless, the moderators are not strong enough to change the afore-mentioned paths.

Last, the model fitness for the three groups is acceptable. First, the R^2 values for T, C, and B respondents are 0.335_{medium}, 0.715_{large}, and 0.348_{medium}. These values show that explanatory power is acceptable for all groups. Second, GoF index is useful for data comparisons to answer how well different subsets of data can be explained by the same path model, where GoF is the squared root of R^2 multiplied by AVE. GoF values around 0.1, 0.25, and 0.36 are respectively considered to represent small, medium, and large fitness level (Henseler and Sarstedt 2013). In this study, with GoF values of 0.355_{large} (T-respondents), 0.327_{large} (B-respondents), and 0.494_{large} (C-respondents), the structural model appears to have acceptable goodness of fit.

V. Conclusion and Discussion

This study reviews the literature on political identities in Taiwan and explores the Taiwanese/Chinese identity, from a social identity perspective. This paper contributes to the literature in two ways. Theoretically, the three-construct model fits the empirical data collected in 2013. It is evident that this social identity inspired model, which passed the goodness of fit test, is appropriately applied to the Taiwan case. The results confirm that the three constructs, national norms, national closeness, and national purposes, have significant positive correlations with state identity. Scholars may find that this new set of latent variable helps in the development and refinement of the ordinal framework, making it more elegant and more applicable for other cases.

Methodologically, by adopting the latent variable approach, this study goes beyond the single-dimension (i.e. nationalism) to multi dimension (i.e. norms, closeness, purposes, and perception) and beyond single-indicator (i.e. categorical choice of Taiwanese and/or Chinese) by introducing a multi reflective indicator to measure abstract concepts. Such a move attempts to advance a cross-discipline dialogue and complementarity between politics and social psychology.

The factor loading results show high loading indicators (>.70) on constructs such as national sameness (0.766) and blood linkage (0.757) in national norms, “state-building (0.818) in “national purposes,” and policy limitations on tourists from China (0.717), and intermarriage with Mainlanders (0.710) in national closeness. The provision of more meaning for these will help scholars understand the complexity of Taiwanese/Chinese identity, which is related to national and cultural identification. Though national closeness was not a strong indicator in this

study, it may be worth developing more indicators to go on to test this construct since it appears to be able to reflect everyday behavior on the national boundary (e.g. media opposition or social contact with Mainlanders. Future studies of national identity may find this list of indicators useful when designing questionnaires, downsizing questionnaires on Taiwanese/Chinese identity, or constructing topics for focus-group discussion.

So what is the meaning of “Taiwanese?” The answer is first that, according to the results, the political trait of respondents self-identifying as Taiwanese is more concerned with issues of Taiwan sovereignty and state status than C, but less concerned with habitual or traditional perception than respondents self-identifying as Chinese. T respondents are younger, and more likely to be female, but their educational level is on average lower than that of B respondents.

The second meaning of “Taiwanese” is represented by those respondents self-identifying as Taiwanese and self-identifying as desiring a sovereign state. However, these respondents self-identifying as Taiwanese take a pro-Taiwan and anti-unification stance, whereas those self-identifying as both exhibit a pro-R.O.C. and democratic unification stance. This result not only echoes Schubert (2004) who found an overarching consensus among Taiwanese (i.e. anti-one country, two systems and safeguarding the sovereign state status in Taiwan), but also Liu (2012a), who showed that one ramification of state identity (i.e. pro-Taiwan vs. pro-R.O.C.) is indeed being in the island. Further interpretation is limited by the characteristics of the cross-sectional dataset used in this study.

Since the number of respondents self-identifying as Chinese is substantially less than respondents self-identifying as both, it raises a puzzle worth studying: identity change. Since identity is a concept that is both durable yet in flux depending on the issues and situation (Huddy 2001), individuals employ interchangeably different identity management strategies (social mobility, social creativity, and social competition) to improve or maintain their social status. Hsu and Fan (2001) posit that individuals self-identify as Taiwanese or Chinese if they can identify which stance is most beneficial. Otherwise, they identify as both or do not respond. In the current study C respondents and B respondents both share pro-R.O.C. and anti-independence stances but differ in their Chinese/Taiwan identity. “Both” may be interpreted as strategic identity management. Those self-identifying as Chinese are assumed take on a “both” identity that emulates the values and practices of the perceived higher-status group (e.g. Taiwanese) to safeguard their declining social position in Taiwan, or perhaps reduce the distrust they experience from Taiwanese in the democratization era as Wu (2002) argues. Indeed, Huang (2009) observes

that “both” identity may refer to an ambivalence and entails anxiety about collective identity as a result of the standoff between Taiwan’s two major political parties. This issue should be the subject of future studies.

There are some other minor issues to discuss. First, the model introduced is still under development, though the model has been well documented and examined via validity tests. Future studies should further examine how the constructs can be woven into Abdelal et al. (2009)’s original framework.

Second, though the definition of national identity can be combined with other concepts, these issues remain outside the scope of this work. I encourage follow-up studies exploring possible indicators that add value to the theoretical model, particularly using probability surveys, non-probability web surveys, or focus groups.

* * *

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Appendix A The Descriptive Analysis of the Survey Questions

Question	Option	Number	Percentage	M	SD.
Age (NAGE)	1. 20-29	145	13.5	3.15	1.306
	2. 30-39	198	18.4		
	3. 40-49	258	23.3		
	4. 50-59	265	24.3		
	5. 60 and above	193	17.9		
	Sub Total	1,059	97.3		
	Item non-response	29	2.7		
	Total	1,078	100.0		
Gender (NSEX)	1. Men	502	46.6	1.53	0.499
	2. Female	576	53.4		
	Total	1,078	100.0		
Education (NEDU)	1. Junior high school and below	147	13.6	2.51	0.843
	2. Senior high school, vocational school	335	31.1		
	3. College	491	45.5		
	4. Master degree and above	99	9.2		
	Sub Total	1,071	99.4		
	Item non-response	7	0.6		
Total	1,078	100.0			
Social contacts					
<i>Traveling to Mainland (V.38_1)</i> Have you been to Mainland in the last two years?	1. Yes	240	22.3	1.78	0.417
	2. No	834	77.4		
	Sub-total	1,074	99.6		
	Item non-response / don't know	4	4.0		
	Total	1,078	100.0		
<i>Relatives staying in Mainland (V.39_1)</i> Any relative been to Mainland for study, business, or work in the last two years?	1. Yes	421	39.1	1.61	0.488
	2. No	655	60.8		
	Sub Total	1,076	99.7		
	Item non-response/ don't know	3	3.0		
	Total	1,078	100.0		

Question	Option	Number	Percentage	M	SD.
<i>Identity choice (V.27_1)</i> Someone says she/he is "Taiwanese." There are also some who say she/he is "Chinese," as well as some who say "both." Do you consider yourself to be Taiwanese, Chinese, or both?	1. Taiwanese	562	52.1	1.91	1.025
	2. Chinese	46	4.3		
	3. Both	431	40.0		
	Sub-Total	1,051	97.5		
	Others/ hard to say/ Item non-response	39	3.7		
	Total	1,078	100.0		
National norms					
<i>National sameness (V.29_1)</i> Do you agree that Taiwanese people and those in China belong to the same nation?	1. Strongly agree	322	29.9	2.22	1.230
	2. Agree	497	46.1		
	3. Neutral	15	1.4		
	4. Disagree	144	13.5		
	5. Strongly disagree	82	7.6		
	Sub-Total	1,054	97.8		
Others/ hard to say/ Item non-response	24	2.2			
Total	1,078	100.0			
<i>Culture sameness (V.12_1)</i> Do you think the contents of Taiwanese culture and Chinese culture are exactly the same, mostly the same, mostly different, or totally different?	1. Totally same	40	3.7	2.40	0.669
	2. Mostly same	611	56.7		
	3. Mostly different	297	27.6		
	4. Totally different	74	6.9		
	Sub-Total	1,022	94.8		
	Others/ hard to say/ Item non-response	56	5.2		
Total	1,077	100.0			
<i>Blood linkage (V21_1)</i> Do you agree that mainlanders are our compatriots?	1. Strongly agree	161	14.9	2.75	1.310
	2. Agree	456	42.3		
	3. Neutral	30	2.8		
	4. Disagree	275	25.5		
	5. Strongly disagree	119	11.0		
	Sub-Total	1,041	96.6		
Others/ hard to say/ Item non-response	37	3.4			
Total	1,078	100.0			

Question	Option	Number	Percentage	M	SD.
<i>Using the Taiwanese language (V9_1, rescaled)</i> Do you agree that we should use Taiwanese as the primary language in Taiwan?	1. Strongly disagree	201	18.6	3.29	1.366
	2. Disagree	417	38.7		
	3. Neutral	89	8.3		
	4. Agree	186	17.3		
	5. Strongly agree	163	15.1		
	Sub-Total	1,066	98.0		
	Others/ hard to say/ Item non-response	22	2.0		
	Total	1,078	100.0		
National closeness					
<i>National superiority (V10_1, rescaled)</i> Do you agree that Taiwanese children are cleverer than those in China?	1. Strongly disagree	185	17.2	3.45	1.285
	2. Disagree	478	44.3		
	3. Neutral	58	5.4		
	4. Agree	164	15.2		
	5. Strongly agree	118	10.9		
	Sub-Total	1,003	93.0		
	Others/ hard to say/ Item non-response	75	7.0		
	Total	1,078	100.0		
<i>Attachment to international competitions (V19_1, rescaled)</i> Do you feel happier when our national sports delegations beat the mainland delegations in international competitions than when we beat teams from other countries?	1. No, not feel remotely happier [even upset]	44	4.1	2.57	1.221
	2. No, not happier	238	22.1		
	3. Neutral	284	26.3		
	4. Yes, happier	206	19.1		
	5. Yes, much happier	290	26.9		
	Sub-Total	1,062	98.5		
	Others/ hard to say/ Item non-response	16	1.5		
	Total	1,078	100.0		
<i>Policy limitations on tourists from mainland China (V22_1, rescaled)</i> Do you agree that our government should implement more restrictive policies for mainland Chinese tourists?	1. Strongly disagree	169	15.7	2.94	1.483
	2. Disagree	358	33.2		
	3. Neutral	19	1.8		
	4. Agree	246	22.8		
	5. Strongly agree	258	23.9		
	Sub-Total	1,050	97.4		
	Others/ hard to say/ Item non-response	28	2.6		
	Total	1,078	100.0		

Question	Option	Number	Percentage	M	SD.
<i>Intermarriage with Mainlanders (V25_1)</i> Could you accept your relatives, such as your son or daughter, marrying Mainlanders?	1. Strongly agree	216	20.0	2.28	1.139
	2. Agree	606	56.2		
	3. Neutral	27	2.5		
	4. Disagree	126	11.7		
	5. Strongly disagree	78	7.2		
	Sub-Total	1,053	97.7		
	Other	21	2.0		
	Total	1,078	100.0		
National purposes					
<i>Identifying Taiwan (V17_1, rescaled)</i> Do you agree that those identifying with Taiwan can be called Taiwanese?	1. Strongly disagree	138	12.8	2.79	1.454
	2. Disagree	332	30.8		
	3. Neutral	17	1.6		
	4. Agree	287	26.6		
	5. Strongly agree	270	25.0		
	Sub-Total	1,044	96.8		
	Others/ hard to say/ Item non-response	34	3.2		
	Total	1,078	100.0		
<i>State building (V23_1, rescaled)</i> Do you agree that Taiwan should establish a self-ruled country?	1. Strongly disagree	97	9.0	2.25	1.371
	2. Disagree	167	15.5		
	3. Neutral	25	2.3		
	4. Agree	325	30.1		
	5. Strongly agree	399	37.0		
	Sub-Total	1,013	94.0		
	Others/ hard to say/ Item non-response	65	6.0		
	Total	1,078	100.0		
<i>Promotion of Taiwanese cultural subjectivity (V26_1, rescaled)</i> To establish cultural subjectivity in Taiwan, elementary and secondary schools should promote local culture education. Do you agree?	1. Strongly disagree	47	4.4	1.76	1.067
	2. Disagree	70	6.5		
	3. Neutral	17	1.6		
	4. Agree	376	34.9		
	5. Strongly agree	558	51.8		
	Sub-Total	1,068	99.1		
	Others/ hard to say/ Item non-response	10	0.9		
	Total	1,078	100.0		

Question	Option	Number	Percentage	M	SD.
<i>National domain (V31_1, rescaled)</i> Do you agree that travelling to Hong Kong or Shanghai can be seen as going abroad?	1. Strongly disagree	44	4.1	1.99	1.079
	2. Disagree	110	10.2		
	3. Neutral	11	1.0		
	4. Agree	511	47.4		
	5. Strongly agree	370	34.3		
	Sub-Total	1,046	97.0		
	Others/ hard to say/ Item non-response	32	3.0		
Total	100	100.0			
State identity					
<i>The proper of name of the state (R.O.C.) (V14_1)</i> Do you agree that “Republic of China” is the formal name of our country?	1. Strongly agree	476	44.2	1.96	1.240
	2. Agree	391	36.3		
	3. Neutral	10	0.9		
	4. Disagree	80	7.4		
	5. Strongly disagree	89	8.3		
	Sub-total	1,046	97.0		
	Others/ hard to say/ Item non-response	32	3.0		
Total	100	100.0			
<i>The pride of being national (R.O.C.) (V15_1)</i> Do you agree that we should be proud of being nationals of the Republic of China?	1. Strongly agree	538	49.9	1.87	1.185
	2. Agree	339	31.4		
	3. Neutral	15	1.4		
	4. Disagree	101	9.4		
	5. Strongly disagree	60	5.6		
	Sub-Total	1,053	97.7		
	Others/ hard to say/ Item non-response	25	2.3		
Total	100	100.0			
<i>Name-rectification of the official name of Taiwan (V28_1, rescaled)</i> Do you agree that “Taiwan” is the formal name of our country?	1. Strongly Disagree	117	10.9	2.34	1.436
	2. Disagree	195	18.1		
	3. Neutral	20	1.9		
	4. Agree	300	27.8		
	5. Strongly agree	404	37.5		
	Sub-total	1,036	96.1		
	Others/ hard to say/ Item non-response	42	3.9		
Total	100	100.0			

Question	Option	Number	Percentage	M	SD.
<i>Democratic reunification</i> (V32_1) Are you willing to reunify with the Mainland if the political institutions of Taiwan and the Mainland are democratic institutions?	1. Strongly like	147	13.6	2.64	1.044
	2. Like	326	30.2		
	3. Dislike	229	21.2		
	4. Strongly dislike	270	25.0		
	Sub-Total	972	90.2		
	Others/ hard to say/ Item non-response	106	9.8		
	Total	1,078	100.0		
<i>Unconditional reunification</i> (V37_1) Do you agree that Taiwan and Mainland should be finally unified?	1. Strongly agree	70	6.5	3.66	1.375
	2. Agree	238	22.1		
	3. Neutral	22	2.0		
	4. Disagree	283	26.3		
	5. Strongly disagree	371	34.4		
	Sub-Total	984	91.3		
	Others/ hard to say/ Item non-response	94	8.7		
	Total	1,078	100.0		

Source: Liu (2012b).

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「臺灣人」的意涵：臺灣人民族認同之概念化

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《本文摘要》

過去「臺灣人／中國人」的認同研究，常以受訪者認為自己是「臺灣人」、「中國人」或「兩者都是」三項擇一的答案作為測量項目，導致測量項目過度簡化的問題。因此，本研究以 Rawi Abdelal 等人的「社會認同 (social identity)」概念，提出一個新的臺灣人民族認同測量模型，並用最小平方途徑之結構方程式 (Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling, PLS-SEM)，發展以「民族規範 (national norms)」、「民族親密度 (national closeness)」及「民族目的 (national purposes)」等三個潛在獨立變項，及「國家認同」潛在依變項的社會心理學分析架構。結果顯示，三個潛在獨立變項均與「國家認同」呈現顯著正相關；其中，「民族規範」具有最高的整體影響力 (total effect)。

其次，自稱為「臺灣人」受訪者比自稱「中國人」的受訪者呈現顯著差異。「臺灣人」的「民族目的」強度比「中國人」高，而「中國人」在「民族規範」強度比「臺灣人」高。再者，比較整體影響力和外權重 (outer weights) 過後，發現自稱「臺灣人」和「兩者都是」的受訪者亦有顯著差異。這兩群受訪者雖都強調「國家建立 (state-building)」(「民族目的」之中的測量指標)，但對「國家認同」的意涵是有不同。自稱「臺灣人」受訪者的立場是親臺灣，反統一；而「兩者都是」受訪者的立場則是親「中華民國」和兩岸民主統一。其他變項，例如年齡、教育和「社會接觸 (social contacts)」對於自稱「臺灣人」和「兩者都是」的受訪者具有調節效應，但強度不足以改變原有因果路徑。

關鍵詞：社會認同、臺灣人／中國人認同、概念化、最小平方途徑之結構方程式

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